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In 2007, emulating the Mexican experience, Mayor Bloomberg
decided that New York City should also have its own conditional
cash transfer programme (CCT). He named the programme
Opportunity NYC after the Mexican Oportunidades. Is Opportunity
NYC just one more CCT in the plethora of existing programmes?
Or will it influence the way educational reforms have been
traditionally conceptualized?
Considering the frustration in the US with past education policies,
there are reasons to believe that, if Opportunity NYC succeeds,
it will influence future reforms. There will be a policy shift from
improving teacher quality and accountability to enhancing
demand by buying student motivation.
Opportunity NYC comprises three different sub-programmes:
(1) Opportunity NYC Family Rewards; (2) Opportunity NYC Work;
and (3) Opportunity NYC Spark. Family Rewards is a programme
in which both parents and children can obtain cash rewards for
activities related to health, education and parental involvement in
school. Work rewards are for recipients of housing vouchers.
It provides monetary incentives for finding paid employment
and enrolling in professional training courses.
This One Pager looks at the Spark sub-programme, which is the
educational component. Spark is solely focused on low-income
students in 4th and 7th grade and gives them cash rewards in
exchange for academic performance. The programme is separately
managed by the City’s Department of Education. The Spark’s
conditions and rewards are as follows: “students in the fourth
grade will receive up to $25 for a perfect score on each of the 10
interim assessment tests taken throughout the year, up to a total
of $250. Seventh graders can earn up to $50 per test for a
maximum payment of $500 per year” (Seedco, 2007).
When compared to other CCT programmes around the world,
Opportunity NYC stands out for making conditions for cash
transfers that are mostly performance-based. The logic behind
transfer conditionalities, in the case of the Mexican Oportunidades
and the Brazilian Bolsa Família, is one of encouraging families to
send their children to school as a way of breaking the
intergenerational cycle of poverty. Their aim is to cope with the
opportunity costs that children face to go to school. In contrast,
Opportunity NYC focuses on improved academic performance
as a condition for cash transfers. Despite not being the first CCT
programme to go beyond school attendance, it is certainly the first
to place grades at the heart of conditionalities (Mexico, Argentina
and the City of Bogota have already made transfers conditional
on grade completion).
Although the programme looks like it is imported from Mexico, it was
completely designed by the American Inequality Lab, led by Professor
Roland Fryer from Harvard University. Fryer argues that poor children
lack the incentives to perform well. He often states that they do
not have a close example of the returns to investing in education.
In his view, cash incentives can provide the real motivation for poor
children to do better in school. This argument goes against the
human capital view of education, which sees it as an investment.
It also neglects the potential role of education as an empowering
and liberating experience.
Opportunity NYC Spark addresses educational performance as
if it were exclusively about parental and student effort and the
availability of cash incentives. It does not tackle the limits of what
students can achieve (no matter how motivated they are) due to,
for instance, lack of teacher qualifications, violence in schools and
scarcity of educational resources.
What then would be the implications of a successful
Opportunity NYC? First, success will mean that the provision
of cash incentives will be given priority in educational reforms,
leaving aside the traditional emphasis on teaching practices,
school finance and governance structures. Longstanding debates
and educational research will shift to determining the exact
cash amount needed to produce the highest test results. Second,
performance-based conditions may spread beyond New York City
borders, “contaminating” not only other US cities and states, but
also CCTs in developing countries.
Consequently, what is considered a pioneering South-North
cooperation between Mexico and New York, may have a boomerang
effect. The South may be compelled to follow-suit after the NYC
experience. If so, we need to be alarmed—supply side issues and
quality of education will be set aside, focusing too much on cash-
based and demand-side incentives.
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